Immigration, Suburbia, and the Politics of Population in US Metropolitan Areas

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Abstract:

Suburbs in the United States, traditionally represented as a homogenous domain of white, middle-class residents, are in the midst of unprecedented demographic change due to immigration. Suburban immigrant populations now outnumber and are growing faster than their counterparts in central cities. Many suburbs across the country have responded unfavorably to these demographic changes, however, pushing in some cases for the implementation of ordinances and other local policies specifically designed to exclude undocumented immigrants from their communities. In this paper, I attempt to understand the political, urban, and demographic processes at play that are shaping the decisions of suburbs to implement local immigration policies. I examine how these policies are part of a broader trend of the devolution of immigration responsibilities to local scales, and I consider how idealized notions of suburban space guide local responses to immigration. Finally, using the Chicago metropolitan area as a case study, I employ spatial analysis techniques to analyze the relationships between settlement patterns of the foreign-born and local political attitudes toward immigration.
During the past two decades, US metropolitan areas have experienced significant demographic and geographic shifts in terms of their immigrant populations. In terms of geography, immigrants are increasingly opting to settle in suburban locations rather than central cities. In fact, in 2000, more immigrants lived in suburbs than central cities, and growth rates of suburban immigrant populations exceeded that of their urban counterparts. These trends of suburban settlement are especially prominent in “newly emerging” immigrant gateways, metropolitan areas whose immigrant populations have risen substantially in the last two decades (Singer 2004). These evolving metropolitan demographic patterns, however, have been met in some cases with substantial resistance by suburban municipalities. Several suburbs across the United States have made headlines for their efforts to enforce immigration policy at the local scale and exclude undocumented immigrants from their communities.

These demographic changes in US metropolitan areas raise significant questions for analysis of US urban and political geographies. Stereotypical representations of American suburbia frequently paint the suburbs as the exclusive domain of the white, middle class (Jackson 1985; Kruse and Sugrue 2006), and indeed many suburban communities have used strategies such as restrictive zoning or racial covenants in attempts to achieve this homogeneity (Fogelson 2005; Freund 2007). Such conceptions of suburbia, in tandem with suburbia’s representation as the geographical destination for those in pursuit of the “American Dream” (Archer 2005), have informed not only both arguments for and against suburbanization (Jackson 1985) but also theoretical interpretations of urban social space such as spatial assimilation theory. The growing diversity of suburban populations, however, calls into question the utility of the suburban stereotype for interpretations of metropolitan space in the United States, as suburbs not only include a wide variety of types of spaces but also a variety of peoples who inhabit those spaces (Jones-Correa 2006; Orfield 2002).
As in the past, some suburbs have responded to these demographic changes with efforts to control population at the municipal scale. Unlike past examples of racial covenants, however, these efforts are less explicitly about race and more concerned with the question of illegal immigrants settling in particular communities. This “re-scaling” of immigration policy to the local level poses important political geographical questions in regards to population policies. Although immigration policy is frequently discussed at the scale of the nation-state, the efforts of some suburban municipalities have served to create interior spaces of immigration policing that craft these municipal spaces as only welcoming of legally documented residents (Ellis 2006; Coleman 2007b).

Demographic change in US metropolitan areas is provoking profound urban and political geographical transformations, which opens a space for population geographers to analyze the interconnections between population movement and the evolution of both suburban space and US immigration policy. In this paper, I intend to provide a framework for embarking on such an analysis. I first will draw from the work of geographers Mark Ellis, Richard Wright, and Mathew Coleman on the relationships between population geography and political responses to immigration, and interpret this in the context of suburbia through analysis of how suburban space has been presented in popular and academic discourses. In the following section, I will address the question of immigration politics in suburbia by examining the rhetoric and strategies employed by various prominent examples of suburban municipalities that have attempted to control immigration at the local level. Finally, through exploratory spatial analysis of demographic data and survey responses towards immigration in the Chicago metropolitan area, I will present some preliminary results of how demographic change in suburbia might relate to residents’ responses, attitudes, and actions taken toward immigration.
Immigrant Concentration, the “Politics of Scale,” and the Localization of US Immigration Policy

Recent work by geographers Richard Wright and Mark Ellis has sought to understand how the politics of immigration manifests itself at the local scale. In their 2000 paper “Race, Region, and the Territorial Politics of Immigration in the US,” they point to the importance of the relationships between immigrant geographies and local immigration politics: “We stress in this paper that tension and anxieties over the foreign-born relate to their geographical concentration. Accordingly, population geographers should explicitly acknowledge that settlement patterns are inseparable from a politics of immigration. Systems of immigrant settlement connect to sentiment about immigration in general; patterns on the land indisputably help constitute attitudes towards those whom Higham identifies as ‘strangers on the land’” (2000, 206). Important in their formulation of this “territorial politics of immigration” in particular is immigrant concentration, and they identify the importance of this at the regional scale, giving the example of California responding to immigrant settlement through proposed restrictive measures such as Proposition 187. Key here is the hypothesis proposed by Wright and Ellis regarding the relationship between immigrant settlement geographies and the politics of immigration. Elevated levels of immigrant settlement in particular geographies, they argue, may in turn provoke negative political reactions to immigration.

Ellis expands upon this concept of a “territorial politics of immigration” in a 2006 paper, “Unsettling Immigrant Geographies: US Immigration and the Politics of Scale.” Ellis reiterates the significance of the relationship between immigrant concentration and negative responses to immigration, arguing that “dispersed immigrant populations have their cultural and physical presence diluted whereas concentration of the foreign-born crystallizes native feelings of loss of numerical dominance, declining control over territory, and a fear of being overrun” (2006, 54). However, he also points to another dimension of sub-national
immigration politics in this paper, namely the increasingly important role of states and localities in handling issues of immigrant incorporation. Social policies, argues Ellis, have increasingly been “downloaded” to states and localities since the 1980s, contributing to a localization of immigration politics in localities that bear the brunt of responsibilities for providing services to immigrants. He writes, “In effect, states and localities have no control over who enters or exits but bear a considerable degree of responsibility, some of it mandated by federal law, for all who are resident” (2006, 53). This “downloading” contributes to a “politics of scale” in regards to immigration, with a federal government responsible for issues of entry and exit and state and local governments responsible for providing services, each of which have very different stakes in terms of immigration politics.

Recent developments in US immigration policy, however, call into question whether the distinction that Ellis makes between the responsibilities of federal and local governments still holds. Although issues of entry and exit and immigration enforcement are traditionally formulated at the national scale (Coleman 2007a), immigration policies framed at sub-national scales have become increasingly important. Geographer Mathew Coleman terms this development “pushing the border inward,” which he argues is an crucial component of post 9/11 US immigration policy: “Indeed, one of the single most important transformations in US immigration enforcement over the past five years has been the unprecedented devolution of the power to police immigration to non-federal agents at the municipal scale” (2007a, 616). Interestingly, part of Coleman’s argument does parallel that of Ellis’s statements about the downloading of responsibilities to local scales. However, a key development here is that in addition to the provision of services for immigrants, immigration policing itself is being devolved to state and local levels. In fact, immigration-related arrests in the interior of the country have increased from 4.9 percent of all apprehensions in 1992 to 12.3 percent in 2003 (Coleman 2007a, 619).
This re-imagination of US immigration policy, argues Coleman, has important ramifications for not only the spatiality of immigration enforcement but also the scales at which the national state operates. He writes, “Indeed, despite its explicit affiliation with the power to conduct foreign affairs and commerce, which are typically thought relevant only outside the black box of the state and in terms of inter-state relations, the sovereign exceptionality of immigration law corresponds to a re-scaling of immigration enforcement in still emerging localized spaces of immigration geopolitics” (2007b, 63-64). Such localized immigration policies include the increased authority of local officials to enforce immigration policy, and contestations over the rights of cities to serve as “sanctuary cities” where local officials would not check the legal status of residents. The variegated nature of these policies, however, has created what Coleman terms “an uneven urban geography of immigration law” (2007b, 66), which has not only created somewhat of a “patchwork” of interior spaces that respond to immigration differently, but also a different sort of border policing that is not just focused on national boundaries but on the interior of the country as well.

The arguments of Wright, Ellis, and Coleman provide a useful framework for interpreting the localization of US immigration politics. Not only are local scales largely responsible for issues of immigrant incorporation, they are becoming increasingly important in regards to immigration policing due to the devolution of immigration policies and responsibilities. Taken together, local governments that are grappling with issues of service provision to immigrants as well as nativism amongst their populations (as per Ellis’s formulation) might logically take steps to control immigration at the municipal scale. Indeed, this has occurred across the country, with geographically diverse localities such as Long Island, NY, Farmers Branch, TX, Manassas, VA, and Lake County, IL, among others, proposing measures, implementing ordinances, or experiencing resident organization that
aims to deter the settlement of immigrants in their communities. While these localities are
diverse in geographical scope, they do have in common a suburban setting that raises
questions about how the localized processes of immigration politics as described by Wright,
Ellis, and Coleman play out in suburbia.

**Immigration, Suburbia, and the Suburban Imaginary**

The presence of immigrants and racial minorities in suburbia is nothing new; many
geographers have weighed in on the subject (e.g. Li 1998, among others), and some
historians working within what they term “the new suburban history” claim that suburbia has
long been more diverse that the suburban stereotype would suggest (e.g. Kruse and Sugrue
2006). However, the magnitude of immigrant settlement in suburbia is currently
unprecedented. In 2000, for the first time, more immigrants lived in suburbs than central
cities, with 52 percent of all metropolitan immigrants in the United States residing outside of
the urban cores. This divide is even more pronounced within larger metropolitan areas
(Singer 2004). In terms of raw numbers, this equated to three million more immigrants in the
suburbs than central cities in 2000. Further, suburban immigrant populations are growing
faster than their urban counterparts, as suburbs experienced a 66 percent growth of their
foreign-born population during the 1990s, as opposed to 43 percent growth in central cities
(Singer 2004). Recent demographic projections also show that 4 in 10 immigrants are
bypassing central cities entirely and settling directly in the suburbs (Roberts 2007).

Certainly, one could argue that these demographic figures merely show that
immigrant settlement is “catching up” with national trends, as over half of all Americans
have lived in suburbs since 1990 (Kruse and Sugrue 2006). However, it is not just the
volume of immigrants settling in suburbia that is significant, but also the characteristics of
the foreign-born populations who are settling there. Studies of spatial assimilation theory,
following the work of Massey (1985), have conceived of the suburb as an assimilative
destination, and have linked attainment of suburban residence with achievement and
assimilation in the United States. Scholars have since problematized the link between
socioeconomic status, assimilation, and suburban residence of the foreign-born, however,
demonstrating not only a weakening association between immigrant assimilation and
suburban residence, notably in terms of English language proficiency, but also challenging
the suburb, and concomitant proximity to whites, as the urban space where assimilated
immigrants will live (Alba et al. 1999; Friedman et al. 2005; Wright, Ellis, and Parks 2005).
My own research on immigration in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area has shown
that while immigrants in the suburbs do generally have higher incomes, education levels, and
English language proficiencies than their urban counterparts, this does not hold for all
immigrant groups, notably among Mexicans who in some suburban locations actually earn
less than Mexican immigrants in the central cities (Walker 2007).

Undoubtedly, the stereotype of the suburb as the exclusive domain of the white,
middle class does not accurately represent its contemporary demographics. However, given
the historical circumstances under which suburban communities developed in the United
States, this “suburban imaginary” continues to hold considerable power. Although studies
have criticized the suburb’s position as an assimilative destination (Wright, Ellis, and Parks
2005), suburban residence and capitalist achievement in the United States have long been
linked together. In his text Architecture and Suburbia, architectural historian John Archer
discusses the connection in the United States between suburbia and upwardly mobile
individuals. He writes, “Well before the ‘American Dream’ became elevated to the status of
a national paradigm for the pursuit of individual aspirations, suburbia already was the terrain
of choice for such pursuits” (2005, 254). As Archer argues, suburbia and the nationalization
of the American Dream emerged together. Success in the United States was equated with
individual achievement, which in turn was reflected by the acquisition of property, most likely taking the form of a suburban home. In terms of immigration, this conceptualization of suburbia is reflected not only in the spatial assimilation literature but also in other scholarship on immigration and “the American Dream,” such as Clark (2003) who examines the linkages between assimilation, home ownership, and suburbanization of immigrants.

When considering suburbia as a social space, however, it is important not to neglect the efforts of various policies, as well as suburbanites themselves, to preserve racial homogeneity in suburban neighborhoods. Scholars have well-documented the role of federal housing policy in favoring racially homogenous white suburban areas at the expense of nonwhite inner city neighborhoods (e.g. Jackson 1985). Other such strategies have included the invocation of racially motivated restrictive covenants that prohibited potential black homeowners from purchasing property in particular neighborhoods (Fogelson 2005; Jones-Correa 2000), enforcement or implementation of zoning codes that restricted the construction of multi-unit housing, or public housing, which were perceived to attract racial and ethnic minorities, in suburban municipalities (Freund 2007; Beauregard 2006), or simply leaving the city entirely for suburban areas to avoid integration, the well-known “white flight” phenomenon (Kruse 2005). While such racial strategies were certainly not flawless (Wiese 2006), they did have profound effects upon the racial geography of US metropolitan areas and, ultimately, the way suburbs are perceived as racial spaces.

As numerous scholars studying the diversity of suburbia have shown (e.g. Orfield 2002; Kruse and Sugrue 2006), it is important not to employ these characterizations of suburban spaces as all-encompassing. However, I would argue that they have had considerable power in creating a suburban imaginary, or “ideal type,” that continues to guide how contemporary suburbs are perceived, both morphologically (in regards to the “American Dream” and the single-family house), and racially. Such a perception is not in accordance,
though, with the suburbia that contemporary demographers and scholars working with spatial assimilation theory have revealed; namely, a suburbia that is increasingly populated by a foreign-born population that need not necessarily have “assimilated” in order to achieve suburban residence. This disjuncture between suburban perception and demographic reality, in concert with the processes of localization of immigration politics outlined by Wright, Ellis, and Coleman, may be informing the decisions of suburbs across the country to control immigration at the municipal scale.

**Local Immigration Politics in Suburbia**

In one sense, a general climate of political conservatism in suburbia could be used to explain why some suburbs are responding differently to immigration than many central cities, who have established themselves as “sanctuary” cities where legal status is not checked (Coleman 2007b). Historians have studied the factors underlying the relationships between suburbanization and political conservatism (McGirr 2001; Kruse 2005), and the work of geographer R. Alan Walks has helped shed light on the factors that contribute to the divergence of political commitments between central cities and their suburbs (Walks 2006). Politics alone, however, cannot fully explain geographical variation in responses to immigration. In analysis of survey data gathered from the “Immigration in America” project conducted by National Public Radio, the Kaiser Foundation, and Harvard University, Fennelly and Federico (2008) found that opposition to immigration among suburbanites remained high even after controlling for political ideology. In Minnesota, a survey conducted by the Minnesota Community Project regarding Minnesotans’ attitudes toward government found that concern over immigration was highest among residents of exurban metropolitan Twin Cities counties, surpassing that of both urban and rural residents (Greenberg, Greenberg, and Hootkin 2004). My own geographical analysis of these survey
data revealed that these concerns about immigration to Minnesota remained strong in outer suburbs, however, regardless of the presence or absence of immigrants in these areas (Walker 2007).

In some cases, the concerns about immigration in suburban communities have led to specific actions taken on the part of residents and local governments to address immigration issues. Some strategies used by suburban governments are explicitly territorial, as they employ tactics designed to regulate housing and settlement behaviors. On Long Island, NY, immigration has emerged as a particularly contentious political issue, exemplified by the mobilization of resident groups depicted in the 2004 documentary *Farmingville*. One of the more notable strategies employed in Long Island, particularly in Suffolk County, is strict enforcement of zoning codes that regulate the number of persons who can occupy a single-family home. One such example is the policy implemented in Southampton Town where landlords must identify each prospective tenant before obtaining rental permits from the town. Inspections designed to enforce these laws have largely targeted Latino-occupied households (Kilgannon 2008). Steve Levy, the Suffolk County executive who has gained notoriety for his hard-line approach to illegal immigration on Long Island, has justified the employment of such practices by invoking the suburban imaginary itself: “People who play by the rules work hard to achieve the suburban dream of the white picket fence. Whether you are black or white or Hispanic, if you live in the suburbs, you do not want to live across the street from a house where 60 men live. You do not want trucks riding up and down the block at 5 a.m., picking up workers” (Vitello 2007).

Farmers Branch, TX, a suburb just outside of Dallas, has partaken in similar strategies to restrict immigrants’ abilities to live within its municipal boundaries. The suburb’s city council passed an ordinance that required landlords to check the legal status of potential renters before entering into a lease agreement, facing fines if they do not comply. Voters
later approved this ordinance by a 2 to 1 margin when it went to a city-wide referendum (Sandoval 2007). Farmers Branch has also approved a resolution making English the city’s official language (Sandoval 2006). In justifying their support for these measures in a message to Farmers Branch voters, city council members Tim O’Hare and Ben Robinson framed their arguments in terms of property values: “The question needs to be asked: what is the cost of not passing this ordinance? Our property value trends are not where they should be in relation to our location, services and natural beauty. From 2002 to 2006, our overall property values have gone down from approximately $3.9 billion to $3.5 billion. We must draw the line now and reverse the trend” (O’Hare and Robinson 2007).

These attempts to implement population policies at the local level draw distinct parallels to past suburban exclusionary initiatives. The attempts of Suffolk County and Farmers Branch to regulate housing resemble the exclusionary zoning and restrictive covenants I discussed earlier, inasmuch as they attempt to regulate the types of settlement behaviors (e.g. one family to a home) and the populations who have the right to settle in particular areas. Further, the arguments made by council members O’Hare and Robinson in Farmers Branch about the relationships between population and property values are highly similar to the rationales invoked in the past to keep blacks out of suburbia. As historian David Freund has shown, suburbanites favoring racial exclusion frequently charged that the presence of blacks in particular neighborhoods would bring down property values, thus making the exclusion of blacks a supposed economic necessity (Freund 2007). The invocation of the “suburban dream” by Suffolk County commissioner Steve Levy is also important. He comments explicitly on how the contemporary demographics of suburbia, characterized in this instance by the non-normative settlement of immigrants in overcrowded housing, are antithetical to what the suburb, in his view, should be. Further, his reference to the suburban dream as something that residents achieve by “playing by the rules” implies that
the immigrants who have settled in these suburbs are not deserving of their suburban residence.

In other instances, this suburban politics of immigration is evolving at the metropolitan scale, but with different municipalities pursuing different courses of action depending on their own demographic circumstances and the political commitments of their residents and political leaders. The Washington, DC metropolitan area is one such example. Washington provides a particularly compelling case, considering the rapid growth of its foreign-born population over the last 40 years, and that immigrants coming to the DC area tend to bypass the central city altogether and settle directly in the suburbs, leading the metropolitan area’s foreign-born population to be heavily suburban (Friedman et al. 2005; Singer 2004). Accordingly, a number of suburban municipalities around the metropolitan area are responding to immigration in their communities.

Manassas, VA, a suburb in Prince William County with a Hispanic population between 20,000 and 30,000, is one such example, where the group Help Save Manassas has gained national notoriety for its organized opposition to immigration (Constable 2007). The group claims to be larger than the Prince William County Republican and Democratic organizations combined, with 1500 members in September of 2007 (HSM 2007). The group emerged after an effort failed in Manassas to redefine the “family” in zoning codes to immediate family members (McCrummen 2006; Constable 2007). Greg Letiecq, president of the organization, explains the rationale for the group’s organization: “Our county has been under assault from the influx of tens, if not hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens who have contributed to rising crime rates, increased burdens on our schools, hospitals, and public services, and the very destruction of our American culture. Prince William County is not the place it used to be, and as a result many of our productive citizens are leaving” (HSM 2007). His formulation is in part a reflection of national debates about immigration’s impact on
security, state and local resources, and American national identity. This statement also has a territorial component, however, which mirrors in part the justifications made in Suffolk County and Farmers Branch. The group has a vested interest in preserving a particular place identity of Prince William County, one in which population is explicitly implicated, evidenced by Letiecq’s concerns about the departure of “productive citizens.” Illegal immigrants, per Letiecq, clearly do not constitute the population of his idealized Prince William County.

Help Save Manassas has since banded together with a number of other like-minded organizations in northern Virginia, including the organization Save Stafford, which is interesting in that it purports to take a proactive response to immigration by following Manassas’s lead, despite the fact that it admittedly has not had significant problems with illegal immigration. Meg Jaworowski, president of the organization, describes her organization’s goals: “We don’t want to see Stafford become soft on issues so we develop the same problems Manassas has. We don’t want to become a haven and invite problems that come along with illegal immigration. . . This hasn’t produced a lot of crime or been a burden on taxpayers of Stafford yet, so we need to take action in order to keep it from becoming the problem it has become in surrounding areas” (Buske 2008).

Responses to immigration in Prince William County also exemplify the arguments made by Coleman (2007a; 2007b) about the devolution of immigration policing to the local scale. Prince William County, among many other local jurisdictions in the country, participates in the 287(g) program, which allows localities to enter into an agreement with the Department of Homeland Security that grants local police authorities the ability to serve as de facto immigration officials by enabling them to check the immigration status of detainees (US ICE 2007).
Not all local governments in the Washington, DC area, however, have responded unfavorably to immigration. Leaders in Montgomery County, MD, and Fairfax County, VA have reiterated that they do not have any intentions of following Prince William County’s lead in cracking down on illegal immigration. However, this stance has been met with contention among some of the counties’ residents (Londoño and Brulliard 2007). In Herndon, VA, a suburb in Fairfax County, Mayor Michael O’Reilly, who supported the construction of a hiring hall for undocumented laborers, was unseated by an opponent who ran on an anti-illegal immigration, anti-hiring hall platform. Herndon is now participating in 287(g) with the backing of its current mayor (Turque and Stewart 2006; Turque and Brulliard 2006).

The example of the Washington, DC metropolitan area points to the complexity of suburban responses to immigration. High-immigration localities like Manassas have responded unfavorably to immigration, whereas other high-immigration suburbs like those of Montgomery and Fairfax Counties have gone in a different direction, despite the vocal opposition of some residents. Further, residents of some communities that have not yet experienced significant immigration, such as Stafford, are pushing for measures to keep immigrants out before immigration becomes a “problem.” These suburban case studies in New York, Texas, and the DC area demonstrate how the processes of localization of immigration politics outlined by Wright, Ellis, and Coleman are working in concert with a suburban imaginary that drives residents’ perceptions of what their communities should look like demographically. What is absent from this analysis to this point, however, is explicit integration of demographic data with these issues of suburban immigration politics. My intent with the following section, using the Chicago metropolitan area as a case study, is to establish a framework for using demographic data and spatial analysis techniques to analyze the relationships between suburban immigration and associated political responses.
Analyzing Suburban Immigration Politics: A Chicago Case Study

Like Washington, DC, metropolitan Chicago has experienced substantial suburban growth of its immigrant populations. During the 1990s, the suburbs’ share of the metropolitan foreign-born population grew from 47 percent to 56 percent, and in Audrey Singer’s 2004 study of demographic patterns in US metropolitan areas, she found that suburban Chicago had a larger absolute increase of its immigrant population than any of the other 45 metropolitan areas she studied (Singer 2004). Further, like the DC area, suburbs have responded quite differently to these demographic changes. Waukegan, Carpentersville, and Lake County have all applied to participate in 287(g) (Krone 2007), whereas other suburbs such as Addison and Palatine have taken steps to integrate their foreign-born populations (Paulson 2007). Further, both Chicago and Cook County have declared themselves ‘sanctuary areas’ (Quintanilla and Bauza 2007). The variegated nature of responses to immigration in the Chicago metropolitan area raises the question of how demographic change might relate to the political responses of suburbanites toward immigration.

To analyze the spatial variability of immigration politics in metropolitan Chicago, I use publicly available survey data from the Pew Center for the People and the Press and the Pew Hispanic Center. In 2006, the Pew Center conducted a nationwide survey project entitled “America’s Immigration Quandary,” in which it conducted 800-person surveys in five metropolitan areas, including Chicago, as well as a separate 2000-person national survey. The Pew Center chose Chicago to conduct the survey because of its long history of immigration, and found the metropolitan area to be relatively tolerant of immigration in comparison with other metropolitan areas (Kohut et al 2006). However, in their analysis, the Pew Center does not examine geographical variability within metropolitan areas, which is what I seek to do with this analysis. I employ the metropolitan definition used by the Pew
Center, though I limit it to Illinois to ensure consistency of spatial data. This metropolitan definition includes the following nine counties: Cook, DeKalb, DuPage, Grundy, Kane, Kendall, Lake, McHenry, and Will (see Appendix). Population data for these counties are obtained from the National Historical Geographic Information System at the University of Minnesota (MPC 2004).

Thematic maps of immigrant settlement by Census tract in the Chicago metropolitan area reveal distinct changes in the geography of immigration from 1990 to 2000. Figures 1 and 2 display the percentage of total tract population that was born outside the United States. These maps reveal how many suburbs experienced a substantial increase in their immigrant populations between 1990 and 2000. In 1990, 67 of the 69 metropolitan tracts with more than 40 percent their population as foreign-born were located within the city of Chicago. Further, the two tracts outside the Chicago city limits that are over 40 percent foreign-born both are located near Chicago’s municipal boundaries. In 2000, the number of tracts outside the central city with a foreign-born population of above 40 percent numbered 53, as opposed to 119 within Chicago’s municipal boundaries. While the raw numbers here do both reflect the increase in the number of Census tracts in metropolitan Chicago as well as the suburbanization of immigration, what is particularly striking is that over 30 percent of all tracts with a foreign-born share of their population above 40 percent are located in the suburbs, as opposed to less than 3 percent in 1990.

The tracts with high percentages of foreign-born residents located outside of Chicago tend to cluster together in a smaller number of suburban municipalities, including Waukegan, Carpentersville, Addison, Elgin, Aurora, Palatine, and Joliet (see Appendix). However, to determine where statistically significant clustering has occurred, I employ the local indicators of spatial association (LISA), or local Moran’s I technique proposed by Anselin (1995), and applied to studies of ethnic concentration by Logan and Zhang (2004). LISA is a measure of
spatial autocorrelation that identifies local clusters of spatial autocorrelation in a particular spatial dataset. Whereas a global Moran’s I statistic merely provides one value that expresses relative spatial autocorrelation for the entire dataset, the local Moran’s I shows where autocorrelation occurs in space\(^1\) (Anselin 1995; Shin and Agnew 2007). The LISA statistics display the relationships between particular geographic units and their “neighbors” as defined by a spatial weights matrix that incorporates spatial relationships amongst polygons. Statistically significant clustering is divided into four categories: high values surrounded by high values; low surrounded by low; and spatial outliers (high/low, and low/high) (Shin and Agnew 2007). Figures 3 and 4 display spatial clustering for Census tracts in the Chicago metropolitan area in 1990 and 2000\(^2\).

As one would expect given the prior thematic maps, clustering of tracts with high percentages of foreign-born residents tends to be almost exclusively located within the central city in 1990, and becomes more suburban in 2000. In both cases, the high Moran’s I values are highly statistically significant, indicating an overall clustered pattern in the metropolitan area; however, three relatively isolated suburban concentrations stand out in terms of their distance from the urban core. These concentrations are located in Waukegan, to the north of Chicago; Elgin, in the western suburbs; and Aurora to the south of Elgin and west of Chicago.

\[ I_i = \sum_{j \in J_i} w_{ij} z_j, \]

where, analogous to the global Moran’s I, the observations \(z_i, z_j\) are in deviations from the mean, and the summation over \(j\) is such that only neighboring values \(j \in J_i\) are included. For ease of interpretation, the weights \(w_{ij}\) may be in row-standardized form. . .and by convention, \(w_{ii} = 0\) (1995, 98).

\(^1\) Following Anselin (1995), “a local Moran statistic for an observation \(i\) may be defined as

\[^2\] Colored tracts are all statistically significant at \(\alpha = 0.05\). Spatial relationships are determined with rooks-case contiguity, and a randomization approach of 999 permutations is used to stabilize the results in this paper (Anselin 2003).
Percent Foreign-Born by Census Tract, 1990
Chicago Metropolitan Area, IL, USA

- Chicago
- County Boundaries

Census Tracts
Percent Foreign Born
- 0% - 5%
- 5.01% - 15%
- 15.01% - 25%
- 25.01% - 40%
- 40.01% - 68.65%
- No population

Data Source: NHGIS, US Census
Projection: State Plane NAD 1983 Illinois East
Cartographer: Kyle Walker
January 20, 2008
Spatial Clustering of Immigration, 1990
Chicago Metropolitan Area, IL, USA

Census Tracts
Clustering - Percent Foreign
- Not Significant
- High-High
- Low-Low
- Low-High
- High-Low

Moran's I: 0.6926

Cartographer: Kyle Walker
Projection: State Plane NAD 1983 IL East
Data Source: NHGIS
None of these areas display statistically significant clustering in the 1990 census, indicating that the foreign-born share of these populations has increased rather dramatically in a short period of time.

The changes in the metropolitan geography of Chicago’s foreign-born population raise the question of how demographic change might influence responses to immigration, recalling that Waukegan, in particular, has applied for 287(g), and that Elgin has asked the federal government for assistance to handle immigration issues, as immigration has become increasingly contentious in the area (Quintanilla and Bauza 2007). To gauge immigration responses quantitatively, I turn to data from the Pew Center. Table 1 addresses how respondents from various municipalities answered the question, “Is immigration in your LOCAL community? A very big problem, a moderately big problem, a small problem, or not a problem at all?” I display the percent of respondents who answered this question in each category in Table 1:

Table 1: Responses to the question “Is immigration in your LOCAL community? A very big problem, a moderately big problem, a small problem, or not a problem at all?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Very Big</th>
<th>Mod Big</th>
<th>Small</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addison</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aurora</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpentersville</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elgin</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joliet</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palatine</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waukegan</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Weighted total number of responses, using the weighting parameters specified by the Pew Center and excluding the respondents who did not answer the question.
Source: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Pew Hispanic Center (Kohut et al 2006).

Responses to this question reveal some varied results. Whereas respondents from some suburbs such as Waukegan and Aurora were highly likely to name immigration as a big problem in their local communities, respondents from other suburbs such as Palatine feel differently about immigration, with the majority responding that immigration is only a small
problem in their community. Samples from Addison and Carpentersville are admittedly quite small, though their responses are still striking, particularly in terms of Addison, which has taken steps to integrate its immigrant population, possibly against the wishes of the respondents in this survey. Elgin’s results, on the other hand, reveal somewhat of a split among respondents in regards to the immigration question; a sizeable percentage feels that immigration in Elgin is a big problem, whereas the rest of the responses cluster at the other end of the spectrum and feel that immigration is not a problem at all.

While these data do suggest some sort of relationship between immigration to certain suburban areas and associated political responses, it is difficult to come to spatial conclusions from tabular analysis of these survey data. Therefore, I turn to the bivariate form of the LISA and analyze spatial autocorrelation of percent foreign-born and survey responses at the zip code scale, as this is the smallest geographic variable available in the Pew Center survey. The bivariate LISA is similar to the univariate LISA inasmuch as it considers the relationships of particular geographic units to its neighbors; however, the key difference is the introduction of a second variable as the spatially lagged variable. Therefore, the bivariate LISA will consider how a variable $x$ in a particular geographic unit correlates with the weighted average of a variable $y$ in its neighboring units (Shin and Agnew 2007).

In conducting this analysis, however, there are some data limitations that I must be explicit about when interpreting the results. First, although the Pew survey provides data for most of the zip codes in the Chicago metropolitan area, the data are not comprehensive. To avoid inaccurate reporting of spatial autocorrelation where data do not exist, I analyze exclusively the zip codes for which I have data. Further, the survey responses in the Pew Report are presented as nominal or rank-order data, which GeoDa cannot use to carry out spatial autocorrelation analysis. To get around this difficulty, I quantify the responses to the question, “Is immigration in your LOCAL community? A very big problem, a moderately
big problem, a small problem, or not a problem at all?” I normalize the four responses on a scale of 10: I assigned respondents a score of 10 for responding “very big problem,” 6.67 for a response of “moderately big problem,” 3.33 for “small problem,” and 0 for “not a problem at all.” I then compute the average for each zip code zone, and assign each zip code its respective average “score” in ArcMap. I also recognize that zip code zones do not necessarily represent meaningful community boundaries for their inhabitants, and I do not intend to assume that the responses of a limited number of individuals are necessarily representative of every individual, or the majority of individuals, in a particular zip code zone. Finally, the “percent foreign-born” variable does not distinguish between documented and undocumented immigrant populations, nor does it acknowledge other variation within the foreign-born population. I do feel, however, that this analysis can provide some substantive geographical conclusions despite the limitations of the data.

Figure 5 displays the results of a bivariate LISA of “percent foreign born” and “survey score” at the zip code level, with the four different types of statistically significant spatial autocorrelations visualized. I choose “survey score” as the local variable and “percent foreign born” as the spatially lagged variable, meaning the correlations measured reveal whether the relationships between the survey score of a particular zip code zone, and the foreign-born percentage of the surrounding zip code zones, depart significantly from a random spatial distribution of these variables. Such an analysis would thus consider a respondent’s “local community,” as referenced by the survey question, to be the surrounding zip code zones. The zip codes visualized in Figure 5 are all the zip codes located within the nine-county Chicago metropolitan area definition I use in this study.

In the study area as a whole, the Moran’s $I$ statistic of 0.0795 demonstrates a weak positive correlation between high concerns about immigration in a zip code zone and the percentage of foreign-born residents of its neighboring zones. This statistic is not significant
at the $\alpha = 0.05$ level. However, some local spatial autocorrelations between the variables do occur. The most striking is located in northern Lake County, where one of Waukegan’s zip code zones indicates significant correlation of high concerns about immigration and surrounding high levels of immigration. Further, all of the surrounding zones consider immigration to be a large problem in their local communities, yet have relatively low levels of immigration in surrounding zones. High-high clustering also occurs in Cook County just west of Chicago. Correlation of high concerns about immigration with low surrounding levels of immigration is found in a variety of areas including Carpentersville, and low-low clustering tends to be concentrated in Chicago’s southern suburbs. Interestingly, there is little correlation within the city of Chicago, although one zip code zone on the northern border of the city displays high-high clustering.

The strong concerns about immigration in Lake County may bear some relationship to Lake County’s status as the only metropolitan area county that has applied for 287(g). The LISA results suggest that Lake County’s decision does reflect to some extent the opinions and concerns of its residents. Interestingly, the high levels of immigration present within Waukegan, who applied for 287(g) before Lake County, are not necessarily present in other parts of the county, as univariate LISA analysis revealed.
It is possible, then, that Lake County residents outside of Waukegan who name immigration as a significant problem may be responding to the immigrant settlement within Waukegan,
and the perceived problems they see there, or out of concern that Waukegan’s foreign-born population might spill over into their communities. If this is the case, it is not entirely unlike other US suburban examples, such as that of Stafford in Virginia where residents have organized against the possibility of immigration, rather than immigration itself within the municipality. Nonetheless, the Lake County example does demonstrate the utility of spatial autocorrelation analysis in helping to understand suburban reactions to immigration. Lake County applied for 287(g) in December of 2007, over a year after the Pew Center conducted its immigration survey (Krone 2007). As such, spatial analysis of demographic and political survey data reveal that the types of spatial autocorrelation present in Lake County may relate to the future political actions that the county would take in regards to immigration.

Conclusions

Increasing levels of immigration in suburbia are certainly important for how population geographers understand the contemporary demography of US metropolitan areas. However, these demographic changes also are implicated in broader urban and political transformations that call into question both the spatiality of US immigration policy and the identity of the suburb itself. In this paper, I have sought to analyze these suburban transformations through a review of contemporary immigration politics in suburbia, as well as exploratory spatial data analysis of demographic patterns and political responses in the Chicago metropolitan area.

Spatial autocorrelation is one such tool that geographers can employ to analyze these transformations. In Chicago, while the overall relationship between negative responses to immigration and presence of immigrants was weakly positive, bivariate LISA analysis revealed clustering of statistically significant zones of high concern regarding immigration in the Waukegan/Lake County area. Further, both Waukegan and Lake County exemplify the
localization of immigration politics in suburbia, given their application to participate in the 287(g) program. Therefore, this analysis reveals a possible link between immigrant settlement patterns, resident responses to immigration, and localized immigration politics in this particular instance. Further, as the policy actions taken by Lake County occurred after the survey data were collected, this study shows how spatial autocorrelation analysis of demographic and political data might be used to foresee which localities might be inclined to pursue strategies of localization of immigration policy.

Local immigration politics in suburbia are admittedly extraordinarily complex, however, and I would be remiss to claim that my exploratory spatial data analysis could reveal any sort of explanatory relationship. Such an analysis, however, does open up potential for future demographic research on this issue. This analysis would involve a more detailed demographic exploration of the data, looking at variations both within the foreign-born suburban populations but also the survey respondents themselves. This could involve a statistical study of spatial assimilation theory’s applicability in high-immigration suburbs, and an examination of whether survey respondents view immigration more favorably when immigrants conform to normative suburban expectations of spatial assimilation. Further, it is important to consider the character of the places where these processes of suburban immigration politics are occurring. I write in this paper of a “suburban imaginary” that proponents of restrictive population policies do invoke at times, as evidenced by arguments made in Suffolk County and Farmers Branch. However, it would be problematic to assume that all suburban areas would cling to such an ideal- Waukegan, for example, has an industrial past that is absent in many suburbs- making it necessary to consider how specific local contexts influence local politics. Such research could involve the integration of qualitative methodologies such as participant observation and key informant interviews.
While exclusionary ordinances in suburbia targeting immigrants are in some respects reflective of the localization of immigration politics, as detailed in the work of Wright, Ellis, and Coleman, I believe that they can also be interpreted as contestations about the transformation of suburban space, and even the spatiality of the US nation-state. Politicians and residents justifying such ordinances may cling to a particular conception of suburban space, where property values are high and hard-working individuals in pursuit of a suburban, American dream can acquire property in suburbia and thus achieve the status of suburban resident. Such a conception crafts the suburb as quintessentially “American,” and thus a space where un-American individuals (most significantly, the undocumented immigrant) are unwelcome. This exemplifies Mathew Coleman’s comment about how “statecraft is about increasingly irregular and uncertain localized conditions of possibility rather than about coherent, macro-scale strategies of state governance” (2007b, 70), as suburbs may be attempting to fashion themselves as sub-national articulations of US national space where (previously federal) population policies will operate. Ultimately, the relationships between population change in suburbia and the local politics of immigration may have profound implications for how we interpret immigration policy, metropolitan space, and importantly the lives of those who live in those spaces. Population geographers, with insights from urban geography, political geography, and spatial analysis, are aptly suited to analyze the implications of these transformations.
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